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Summary 
Apart from China, there are two other large energy consumers in North-East Asia: Japan and South 
Korea. These economies, which belong to the OECD, are highly dependent on imports (which 
account for over 80% of domestic consumption in both cases), especially oil and natural gas. In 
recent years their energy security has been subject to serious threats. This Working Paper briefly 
addresses the position and energy forecasts for the two countries. It proceeds to analyse the strategic 
responses of Tokyo and Seoul to the deterioration (whether perceived or real) of their energy 
security, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Finally, the paper details 
some of the lessons that other countries which are highly dependent on energy imports might learn 
from the experience of Japan and South Korea. 
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Introduction 
Energy security in East Asia is important not only for the economic development of a region which 
could become the centre of the world in the XXI century, but also for the energy situation in other 
parts of the world. For example, if the main Asian energy-consuming countries (China, Japan, India 
and South Korea) find themselves compelled to notably increase their consumption of natural gas, 
either in the form of liquid natural gas (LNG) or that transported by gas pipeline, the availability 
and prices of gas in Europe would doubtless be significantly affected. 
 
In recent years, experts have understandably focused above all on the case of China, given the 
Asian Giant’s high increase in energy demand. The interest in China has prevailed somewhat at the 
expense of analysis of the other great East Asian consumers, Japan and South Korea: economies 
well-known as being of great importance and which are also OECD members. Japan and South 
Korea are high in the rankings of the world’s main energy consumers and importers: suffice, for the 
time being, to recall that Japan is the world’s third-largest consumer of oil and that Japan and South 
Korea are the world’s two biggest importers of coal and LNG. 
 
Given their importance as energy consumers and importers, energy security –especially insofar as it 
affects self-sufficiency, reliability and security of external supplies, and the prices of purchases 
abroad– is forming an increasingly essential aspect of their economic development strategy. 
 
The present paper has two objectives. First, it aims to analyse the scope and implications of Japan 
and South Korea’s high external dependence. Secondly, it attempts to analyse the short and mid-
term perspectives for this dependence and for the two countries’ strategies for addressing the 
situation. 
 
1. Energy Security in North-East Asia: An Overview 
 
Energy security is a particularly important matter in North-East Asia, in view of the fact that this 
region is home to great world consumers, and given the high dependence with respect to imports, 
especially of oil and natural gas.1 Although in recent years experts have stressed the case of China, 
as a consequence of the high increase in its demand,2 there are two other countries in the region –
Japan and South Korea– in which questions of energy security are at least as serious as in China. 
 
In 2006, Japan occupied the fourth place in world energy consumption (behind the US, China and 
Russia), it was third in oil consumption (after the US and China), fourth for coal (behind China, the 
US and India) and sixth for natural gas and nuclear power. For its part, South Korea, of less 
demographic weighting and per capita income, is also a significant consumer of energy (it is tenth 
for primary energy, seventh for oil and sixth for nuclear power). 
 
Net energy imports account for over 80% of consumption in Japan and South Korea, a proportion 
which is higher than Spain’s and much higher than those of Germany and France. Furthermore, 
since Japan and South Korea do not have oil, natural gas and coal resources, they import practically 
everything that they need (as opposed to China, which does have significant coal and oil 
production, and which, until now, has even met its natural gas needs with its own production). 
Japan is the second-biggest importer of oil (behind the US), while South Korea is in fifth place, 
ahead of France and India. Japan and Korea are two of the world’s biggest importers of LNG and 
coal. 
 
                                                 
1 See the general studies on energy security in Asia in Isbell (2006), Pardesi et al. (2006), CRS (2007), Bubalo and 
Thirlwell (2007), Harris and Naughton (2007), Niquet (2007), Wesley (2007), Wu et al. (2007) and Cole (2008). 
2 In Spain, see working papers including Bustelo (2005) and Palazuelos and García (2007), among others. 
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According to the APERC (2007) index on energy insecurity for 2004, Japan and South Korea have 
a relatively high degree of energy diversification and are making a serious effort to advance in non-
carbon based fuels. However, they have a very high dependence on net energy imports, weighted in 
terms of the weighting of each source over total consumption (although this is approximately on a 
par with that of the US), a very high dependence on oil imports, weighted in terms of the weighting 
of oil within primary energy consumption (76% in South Korea and 69% in Japan), and an 
extremely high dependence with respect to oil imports from the Middle East (80% in Japan and 
76% in South Korea). 
 
Table 1.1 displays the values of the index of energy insecurity proposed by Wu and Morrisson 
(2007), which refer exclusively to oil.3 
 
Table 1.1. Index of energy insecurity (oil), 1995, 2005 and 2015p 
 1995 2005 2015p
Japan 77.8 76.7 75.5
South Korea 82.5 76.3 75.2
Europe 46.6 46.0 46.2
US 38.9 41.6 42.1
China 12.9 35.8 45.2
India 47.9 56.3 59.3
Note: a higher index score equals higher insecurity. 
Source: Wu and Morrisson (2007), table 1, p. 208. 
 
The main conclusions in regard to the values for these indices in Japan and South Korea are that 
these two countries are very dependent on energy imports, oil imports and the supply of oil from the 
Middle East. The forecasts for 2015 of Wu and Morrisson’s synthetic oil insecurity index (2007) 
would appear to suggest that the insecurity of Japan and South Korea will remain very high (in spite 
of a slight decrease in both cases), that is to say, much higher than the scores forecast for Europe 
(which will practically remain unchanged), for the US (which will grow slightly) and for China and 
India (which will rise considerably). 
 
2. Japan’s energy security strategy: the shadow of China 
 
The energy system in Japan has two main features:4 first, as stated above, the country is a very 
important consumer of energy;5 secondly, it is highly dependent on abroad. Net energy imports 
accounted for 81.2% of its primary energy consumption in 2005, a percentage that is amongst the 
world’s highest and which has hardly fallen since 1990 (in fact, it has increased slightly since 
2001).6 
 
In recent years, Japan has had to face up to growing challenges to international energy security (an 
increase in geopolitical risks in the main producing regions, the strong increase in demand from 
China and India, energy nationalism in certain countries, etc). This context has led the Japanese 
authorities to implement firm policies to increase government intervention in the internal and 
                                                 
3 The index is a synthesis of three primary indicators: net oil imports in relation to oil consumption, weighted at 40%; 
oil consumption in relation to primary energy consumption, weighted at 35%; and imports from the Middle East as a 
proportion of total oil imports, weighted at 25%. In view of the primary indicators and weightings that it employs, it is 
obviously an index that may be questioned. See the somewhat more sophisticated international comparison of indicators 
in APERC (2007), although only for APEC member countries and territories. 
4 See a general overview of Japan’s energy industry in EIA (2006). 
5 In short, in 2006 Japan accounted for 4.8% of the world’s energy consumption, but this proportion was significantly 
lower than its weighting in the gross world product, which was 10.3% in 2005 (and 7.04% in purchasing power parity), 
according to the new World Bank estimates. See World Bank, The 2005 International Comparison Program – 
Preliminary Results, Washington DC, 2007. 
6 According to the Energy Balances of OECD Countries, it was 81.9% in 2004, a percentage which is similar to that of 
South Korea (82.1%), higher than that of Spain (77.1%) and, obviously higher than those of Germany (60.9%), France 
(50.1%) and the US (29.4%). 
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external markets, as well as to increase the country’s energy security, factors which could lead to an 
increase in Japan’s rivalry with China and South Korea. 
 
But Japan is not only a large consumer and importer of energy. It is likewise a country which in 
terms of its energy development could serve to inspire others in many ways.7 For example, in recent 
years its oil consumption in absolute terms and its per capita energy consumption have both fallen. 
Japan’s energy intensity is currently lower than that of Germany and France, and substantially 
lower than that of the US. As Prime Minister Fukuda said at the Davos meeting of the World 
Economic Forum (in January 2008), energy consumption in industry has remained stable for 30 
years, despite the fact that GDP has doubled, while CO2 emissions per unit of GDP are amongst the 
lowest in the world (Fukuda, 2008). Moreover, the country is proposing to undertake significant 
investments in alternative energy sources. These could be promising (including, for example, those 
in the automobile, electronics and hybrid industries), and could turn Japan into a fundamental 
incubator of innovative techniques for the future of humanity. In addition, given its high level of 
development and its significant cooperation with other Asian countries, Japan’s capacity for 
disseminating energy advances amongst neighbouring countries is very high. 
 
2.1. Energy Production and Consumption 
Production of primary energy reached 99.7 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 2005 (for a 
consumption five times higher), of which 79.4 Mtoe were of nuclear origin. In other words, 75% of 
energy production in 2005 came from nuclear power, since resources of fossil or mineral fuels 
(coal, oil and natural gas) are practically non-existent, while there is very little hydraulic or other 
types of renewable energy. Production of primary energy in Japan is therefore very low, especially 
in comparison with other advanced countries. These include Germany (134.5 Mtoe), France (136.9 
Mtoe) and the UK (204.3 Mtoe), according to IEA statistics (2007a and 2007b). 
 
In 2006, according to the BP data (2007) primary energy consumption (PEC) stood at 520.3 Mtoe, 
making Japan the fourth biggest global consumer (behind the US, China and Russia), with a share 
of 4.8% of the world total (Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1. Main consumers of primary energy in 2006 (Mtoe and % of world total) 
Ranking Country Mtoe % total world
1 US 2,326 21.4
2 China 1,698 15.6
3 Russia 705 6.5
4 Japan 520 4.8
5 India 423 3.9
6 Germany 329 3.0
7 Canada 322 3.0
8 France 263 2.4
9 United Kingdom 227 2.1
10 South Korea 226 2.1
Source: BP. 
 
PEC distribution by energy type shows that oil remains the main source of energy (at 47% of PEC 
in 2005), followed by coal (22%), natural gas (14%) and nuclear power (11%). According to IEEJ 
data (Kanekiyo, 2007), since 1990 oil has fallen proportionately, coal and natural gas have risen, 
and the part corresponding to nuclear power has remained constant. Another of Japan’s significant 
characteristics is that hydroelectric energy and renewable energies make up barely 6% of PEC, a 
proportion that has hardly altered since 1990 (Table 2.2). 
 
                                                 
7 See, for example, ‘Japan’s Energy Conservation Obsession’, International Herald Tribune, 7/I/2007, and ‘Japan’s 
Energy Wisdom’, International Herald Tribune, 28/III/2007. 
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Table 2.2. Japan: consumption of primary energy by energy type (as % of the total), 1973, 1990 and 2005 
 1973 1990 2005
Oil 77 57 47
Coal 15 17 22
Natural gas 2 10 14
Nuclear 1 10 11
Hydro-geothermic 4 4 4
New energies 1 2 2
Sources: IEA and IEEJ. 
 
Another prevailing feature of the structure by energy types is that Japan (as is the case with South 
Korea) depends significantly on oil. At 45% in 2006 (47% in Korea), the percentage is higher than 
in China (21%) and India (28%), which continue to depend greatly on coal, but also greater than in 
Germany (38%) or the US (40%), where the relative weighting of natural gas is appreciably higher, 
according to BP data (2007). 
 
The evolution of PEC in recent years shows relatively high growth in the 1980s (with an average 
annual growth rate of 2.0%) and even in the 19990s (1.4%). But since 2000, this expansion has 
been much slower (0.5% in 2000-2006). Indeed, as we shall see below, oil consumption has fallen 
since 1996, when it peaked at 5.81 million barrels a day (Mbd). In 2006, consumption fell to 5.16 
Mbd. For the purpose of comparison, oil consumption in the US rose from 18.30 Mbd in 1996 to 
20.58 Mbd in 2006. 
 
Table 2.3 shows the distribution of the consumption of final energy by sector. It can be seen that the 
main sectors are heavy industry, at 40%, and commercial-residential, at 33%. The significant fall in 
the transport industry (and also heavy industry) since the 1980s stands out, as does the increase in 
the proportion corresponding to the commercial-residential sector. 
 
Table 2.3. Japan: consumption of final energy by sectors (as a % of the total), 1973, 1980, 2002 and 2005 
 1973 1980 2002 2005
Transport 16.4 55.4 27.4 26.5
Commercial/residential 18.1 21.4 31.6 33.1
Heavy industry 65.5 52.9 41.1 40.4
Sources: IEA, APERC and IEEJ. 
 
In comparison with other developed countries, the relative weighting of heavy industry is fairly 
high (40%, as opposed to an average of 22% for the OECD as a whole), given that Japan still 
retains a significant industrial base, which, despite improvements in efficiency, continues to 
consume large quantities of energy. 
 
The IEA forecasts (2007c) suggest that PEC will increase from 530 Mtoe in 2005 to 589 Mtoe in 
2015, and to 601 Mtoe in 2030, with average annual growth rates of 1.1% in 2005-2015 (practically 
the same as for the period 1990-2005), and of barely 0.1% for 2015-2030. Worthy of note is Japan’s 
much lower PEC growth in the past and forecast PEC growth with respect to China and India. 
 
 
Table 2.4. Forecasts for primary energy consumption and oil, 2015 and 2030, with data for 1990 and 2005 (Mtoe 
and average annual growth rates in %) 
PEC 1990 2005 2015 2030
AAGR (%)
1990-2005
AAGR (%)
2005-2015
AAGR (%)
2015-2030
Japan 444 530 589 601 1.2 1.1 0.1
China 874 1,742 2,851 3,819 4.7 5.0 2.0
India 320 537 770 1,299 3.5 3.7 3.5
OECD 4,518 5,542 6,180 6,800 1.4 1.1 0.6
World 8,755 11,429 14,361 17,721 1.8 2.3 1.4
 
TPEC 1990 2005 2015 2030
AAGR (%)
1990-2005
AAGR (%)
2005-2015
AAGR (%)
2015-2030
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Japan 253 249 238 211 -0.1 -0.5 -0.8
China 116 327 543 808 7.2 5.2 2.7
India 63 129 188 328 4.9 3.8 3.8
OECD 1,893 2,247 2,385 2,478 1.1 0.6 0.3
World 3,261 4,000 4,720 5,585 1.4 1.7 1.1
Source: IEA, 2007. 
 
Table 2.4 also reveals that consumption of oil in Japan has fallen since 1990 and that it will 
continue to do so in the coming decades. 
 
The IEEJ forecasts for PEC distribution by types of energy (see Kanekiyo, 2007a and 2007b) 
indicate that the weighting of oil will continue to fall, in favour of natural gas and of nuclear power, 
while the proportion of coal will remain constant (Table 2.5). It is equally noteworthy that the 
weighting of hydroelectric energy, geothermic energy and the new energies will barely increase at 
all: from 6% in 2005 to 7% in 2030, after peaking at 9% in 2010. 
 
Table 2.5. Japan: forecasts for primary energy consumption by energy type (as a % of the total), 2010 and 2030 
 2005 2010 2030
Oil 47 44 37
Coal 22 18 18
Natural gas 14 14 18
Nuclear 11 15 20
Hydro-geothermic 4 4 2
New energies 2 5 5
Source: IEEJ. 
 
In terms of consumption of final energy by sectors (Table 2.6), it can be seen that the proportions 
will remain practically unchanged during the coming decades. Thus, according to APERC (2006), 
in 2030 the weighting of heavy industry will be 39%, ahead of the commercial-residential sector 
(34%) and transport (26%). 
 
Table 2.6. Japan: forecasts of consumption of final energy by sectors (Mtoe and % the total), 2010, 2020 and 
2030 
 2002 % 2010 % 2020 % 2030 %
Industry 141.6 41.1 147.4 39.7 152.4 39.0 156.6 39.4
Transport 94.4 27.4 102.8 27.7 104.9 26.8 104.4 26.3
Res/com 108.8 31.6 121.5 32.7 133.4 34.1 136.5 34.3
Total  344.8 100.0 371.7 100.0 390.7 100.0 397.5 100.0
Source: APERC. 
 
2.2. Energy Imports 
Net energy imports rose from 303.2 Mtoe in 1980 to 430.7 Mtoe in 2005. The latter figure 
represents 81.2% of consumption, a percentage that has increased since 2001 and that only recorded 
a slight decrease since 1990. These imports do not take into account imports for the nuclear 
industry. If they are included, dependence with respect to imports would rise to 96% (METI, 2007). 
 
Table 2.7. Japan: Production, consumption and net imports of primary energy, 1980-2005 (thousands of Toe and 
% of consumption) 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Production 43,281 66,747 76,817 100,414 107,373 106,161 98,670 85,457 96,758 99,792
Consumption 346,526 364,903 445,966 502,449 528,936 520,836 521,652 516,106 533,201 530,463
NetM 303,245 298,156 369,149 402,035 421,563 414,675 422,982 430,649 436,443 430,671
Mn/PEC (%) 87.5 81.7 82.8 80.0 79.7 79.6 81.1 83.4 81.9 81.2
Source: IEA. 
 
In terms of crude imports (4.19 Mbd in 2006), it is important to note two facts: in absolute terms 
they have fallen since 1997, when they reached a maximum of 4.59 Mbd; and they are largely from 
the Middle East (87%), a region where the main suppliers are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran and 
Qatar (Table 2.8). 
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The percentage of oil imports from the Middle East is very high in Japan, compared with 47% for 
China, 24% for Europe and 17% for the US. In addition, it is likely that dependence with respect to 
oil imports from the Middle East will rise in the coming years, in spite of government attempts to 
develop supplies from other regions (Russia, Central Asia, Africa etc.) and to ensure increased use 
of natural gas and of nuclear power (Hosoe, 2005). 
 
Table 2.8 also highlights several significant facts: imports from the Middle East are quite 
diversified by countries; the weighting of Iraq is practically zero; the weighting of Africa is now 
appreciable (especially for Sudan), and the very recent increase of that of Russia (3.5% in 2007) –
which will surely increase greatly in the coming years–. 
 
Table 2.8. Japan: imports of crude by regions and countries of origin, 2000-2007 (in %) 
 2000 2004 2006 2007
The Middle East 87.9 88.9 89.2 86.7
   Saudi Arabia 24.2 24.5 30.0 26.9
   UAE 25.5 25.3 25.4 24.5
   Iran 12.8 15.0 11.5 12.1
   Qatar 9.6 9.3 10.2 10.4
   Iraq 1.4 2.2 1.0 1.0
Russia – 0.7 0.7 3.5
Central Asia – – – 0.2
South-East Asia sd 5.3 4.4 4.7
   Indonesia 4.8 3.5 2.8 3.0
Africa 0.7 4.2 4.4 3.6
   Angola – – 0.8 0.2
   Guinea – 0.1 0.3 0.5
   Sudan – 1.8 2.6 2.5
Australia 1.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
China 2.2 0.2 0.4 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: IEA and METI. 
 
As far as oil derivatives are concerned (table 2.9), according to the IEA data for 2004, the Middle 
East accounted for 46% of supplies, followed by Asia (31%; including 12% from South Korea and 
8% from Indonesia) and the US (8%). These proportions have remained more or less stable in 
recent years. 
 
Table 2.9. Japan: imports of oil derivatives, by regions and countries of origin, 1996-2004 (in %) 
 1996 2000 2004
The Middle East 44.8 44.1 46.0
   Saudi  Arabia 18.4 16.1 17.6
   UAE 10.3 15.0 13.6
   Kuwait 10.7 9.4 8.4
   Qatar 2.2 2.0 4.4
Asia 31.4 35.9 31.2
   South Korea 11.9 21.1 12.0
   Indonesia 7.8 4.8 8.4
   Singapore 5.6 3.2 3.7
   India 1.0 1.9 2.8
US 9.1 7.3 8.3
Former USSR 0.8 0.6 1.7
Rest 13.9 12.1 12.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: IEA. 
 
The following suppliers stand out for natural gas imports: Indonesia (27%), Malaysia (23%), 
Australia (15%), Qatar (12%), Brunei (11%) and UAE (9%), according to METI data 2004 
(Christoffels, 2007, p. 11). There are plans to increase the proportion imported from the Middle 
East, Russia and Australia. To date, these have been LNG imports (shipped by sea), although there 
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is currently a debate regarding the possibility of constructing a gas pipeline from Sakhalin, on 
Russia’s Pacific coast (Akasura et al., 2007). 
 
Finally, Australia (33%) and Canada (27%) are the main countries for uranium imports. The 
proportion from Kazakhstan is still very low (1%), but there are plans to considerably increase it 
(Masaki, 2007). 
 
Japan is now beginning to import significant quantities of oil and gas from Russia. There are plans 
for imports of Russian crude from Sakhalin and Siberia to rise considerably, as well as natural gas 
imports, not only from Sakhalin, but also from the Kovykta field, near Irkutsk, if the problems for 
the construction of a gas pipeline to the Pacific are overcome (Ahn and Jones, 2008; Masaki, 2008). 
 
The Taishet-Skovorodino-Nakhodka oil pipeline is at design stage. This will link the oil sources to 
the west of Lake Baikal and the Pacific coast (Lee and Lee, 2006; Itoh, 2007). In 2003, China was 
initially able to ensure that the oil pipeline would not have this route, but rather that it would link 
Angarsk with Daqing (China). Nevertheless, Japanese diplomacy won the day and in 2005 Russia 
announced that it would build the Taishet-Skovorodino section and a first branch from there to 
Daqing (to supply China), followed by a second branch to Nakhodka (to supply Japan and Korea). 
 
An underwater gas pipeline between Sakhalin and Japan could greatly increase Russia’s gas 
exports, but it has remained at discussion phase until now. As is well known, Russia has two 
different projects in Sakhalin: Sakhalin 1 –in which ExxonMobil is participating– which exports oil 
to East Asia8 and supplies natural gas to the rest of Russia, without having ruled out the possibility 
of gas exports too; and Sakhalin 2, which, in addition to Gazprom, features the participation of 
Shell, Mitsubishi and Mitsui, and which exports gas to Japan, Korea and the US. 
 
2.3. Strategies to Guarantee Supply 
2.3.1. Ways 
Prior to 2006, important steps were taken to diversify energy sources and suppliers, as well as to 
create a strategic oil reserve and to invest in resources, via exploration and the development of oil 
and gas fields abroad (Hosoe, 2005; Yokobori, 2006; PAJ, 2007). More recently, the report 
coordinated by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), also known as the ‘27 
recommendations’, was delivered to Prime Minister Koizumi in May 2006 (see the complete text in 
JFIR, 2006, and a summary in Toichi, 2006). In June of 2006, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI) published the New National Energy Strategy (NNES) –see the complete text in 
METI, 2006, and a summary in Hughes, 2006; Masaki, 2006a, and ECCJ, 2007–. Lastly, in March 
2007, the Diet of Japan definitively approved the Basic Energy Act, based on the NNES. 
 
The analysis underlying Japan’s new energy strategy is based on taking into consideration the 
growing challenges to the country’s energy security that have arisen in recent years and which have 
been highlighted by many experts (see, for example, Evans, 2006; Christoffels, 2007; and Jain, 
2007). 
 
These challenges are both general (those affecting all the big consumer countries) and particular 
(those specific to Japan). 
 
The general challenges are well known: awareness-raising of the finite nature of fossil fuels; an 
increase in the geopolitical risks in the main producing areas (terrorism, nationalisation, restrictions 
                                                 
8 Sakhalin-1 will become increasingly important in Japan’s crude supply. See ‘Nippon Oil Buys Crude from Sakhalin-1 
Under Long Term Contract’, Bloomberg, 19/II/2008. 
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on foreign investment etc.);9 the exhaustion of oil and gas reserves in the US and the EU; the high 
past and future increase in demand by China and India; global investments that are likely to be 
insufficient; and price increases, that are likely to prevail in the mid-term. 
 
Japan’s particular challenges are diverse. First, the increase in the demand from China10 has had and 
will continue to have serious repercussions in Japan, given questions of geographic proximity and 
historic rivalry between the two countries. Secondly, in recent years there has been a heightening of 
competition with China and India for the oil and gas resources of the Middle East11 and Russia, as 
well as with China and South Korea for resources in Central Asia.12 In this context, the difficulties 
involved in solving the territorial disputes in the East China Sea (the Eastern Sea for the Koreans 
and the Sea of Japan for the Japanese) involving the Diaoyu or Senkaku islands and the small 
islands of Tokto or Takeshima (Lynch, 2007). Third, the likely increase in dependence with respect 
to the Middle East (APERC, 2006, p. 4; APERC, 2007, p. 66) is especially worrying given that 
geopolitical risks have increased significantly in that region, making it potentially very unstable –
especially because of the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan and the dispute between the US and 
certain EU countries and Iran–. Fourth, as is the case in other producing zones, there is growing 
energy nationalism in Russia.13 This phenomenon has caused serious concern in Japan: for Taro 
Aso, the second biggest risk for international energy security is that produced by the fact that 
‘resource nationalism has resurged throughout the world as a result of the high prices of oil and 
other minerals’ (Aso, 2007, p. 37). Fifth, Japan’s foreign policy, aligned with that of the US, has led 
to setbacks in Iran (Pontius, 2006; Masaki, 2006b) and might accentuate rivalry with China. Sixth, 
the international regulations on nuclear power (the non-proliferation regime) and climate change 
(the Kyoto Protocol) are additional challenges for countries having opted for nuclear power and 
which still depend heavily on fossil fuels. Seventh, the fact that Japan is developing links with non-
traditional suppliers, such as those in Central Asia, Africa or Latin America, entails considerable 
lengthening of the supply chains. Eighth and last, in Japan the high proportion of energy transported 
through the so-called chokepoints (the straits of Hormuz, Malacca and Singapore) is especially 
worrying, in view of how susceptible they are to being affected by terrorism by a large-scale 
conflict (for example, between the US and Iran), as Watkins indicates (2006). For Taro Aso, 
insecurity in the straits is the third biggest challenge to international energy security in general and 
to that of Japan in particular: he highlights the need for ‘further international co-operation for 
enhancing the security and diversity of energy transportation routes. The straits of Malacca, 
Singapore and Hormuz are particularly important’ (Aso, 2007, p. 37). 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the general objectives of the NNES of 2006 are the following 
three. First, more active governmental intervention in the markets, so as to create strategic links 
between the energy companies and the governmental institutions –with aim of ensuring greater 
security in the supply of resources (as a strategy it contrasts with the more liberal one of the 
1990s)–. Secondly, a strengthening of resource diplomacy: economic aid, technical support, soft 
power, both in producing countries and in consumer countries competing with Japan (for example, 
aid for diversification and energy-saving in China), in order to reduce the competition in 
                                                 
9 The former Foreign Affairs Minister, Taro Aso, wrote in an article published at the start of 2007 that the main risk to 
world energy security was the ‘geopolitical uncertainty in the Middle East and other energy producing regions’ (Aso, 
2007, p. 37). 
10 And –although to a lesser extent– also that of other East Asian countries, and even India. 
11 In the next few years it is also likely that there will be an increase in dependency on demand from southern and 
eastern Asia with respect to the Middle East. 
12 Especially, at least for the time being, of oil and uranium and not so much gas (Masaki, 2007), although the situation 
may change once the gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and China has been built, in accordance with the two 
countries’ 2007 agreement. 
13 As far as East Asia is concerned, this nationalism was patent in the case of Sakhalin-2, with the initial presence of 
Mitsui, followed by that of Shell and Mitsubishi, companies which were obliged to sell a majority holding to Gazprom 
in December 2006. The result is that since then the Russian company has controlled LNG exports to Japan. See 
Christoffels (2007, p. 44 onwards). 
 10
international demand for oil and gas. Third, an increase in emergency response capacity (with an 
increase in strategic oil and gas reserves). 
 
The specific NNES objectives can be listed as follows: 
 
(a) Diversification of the energy sources towards nuclear power, natural gas and the renewable 
energies, to which end the government proposes to reduce oil as a proportion of PEC from 47% 
in 2005 to 40% in 2030 and oil as a proportion of consumption in the transport industry from 
100% to 80%, via the introduction of bio-ethanol and of electric automobiles, as well as by 
increasing the percentage of electricity of nuclear origin in total electricity from 30% to 40% in 
the same period. Likewise, the government seeks to strengthen Japan’s dominant position on 
the LNG market, which has been somewhat weakened in recent years (Christoffels, 2007, p. 51 
and ff.). 
(b) Geographical diversification of suppliers: from the Middle East towards Russia, Central Asia, 
Africa (Libya or Nigeria), Australia, Latin America, Canada, etc, with the Siberia-Pacific coast 
oil pipeline being of ‘strategic importance’. 
(c) A substantial reduction in energy intensity, with an increase of 30% in GDP generated per unit 
of PEC between 2005 and 2030. 
(d) An increase in stocks of oil and gas. 
(e) Greater direct control on resources abroad. The government aims to increase the level of the so-
called equity oil (oil controlled by national companies) from 15% of crude imports in 2005 to 
40% in 2030. 
 
2.3.2. Requirements and Demands 
On an initial viewing, Japan’s new energy strategy would appear to be sensible. Nevertheless, the 
objectives set might also appear to be extremely modest; although it is also true that they will not be 
easy to achieve. 
 
Diversification towards sources other than oil and coal must be substantially quickened if Japan is 
to comply with its Kyoto Protocol commitments. According to the Protocol, Japan must reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 6% in 2008-2012, with respect to 1990. However, it would appear 
difficult for the country to meet this target, given that in 1990-2005 emission of these gases actually 
rose by 7%, according to UNFCCC data.14 Therefore, in order to comply with its commitments in 
the fight against climate change, Japan must accelerate the pace of restructuring of its energy 
industry towards nuclear power, hydroelectric energy and the renewable energies. 
 
Moreover, the nuclear power projects –which are significant (there are 55 operating reactors, and a 
further 13 planned for 2030)– are to a certain extent blocked due to the technical problems they 
involve and the fact that public opinion is generally opposed to nuclear power. In July 2007, the 
Kashiwazaki nuclear power station (in Niigata prefecture) –the world’s largest– which has seven 
reactors, was affected by an earthquake which measured 6.8 on the Richter scale, and had to be 
indefinitely closed. The resistance of local government to the construction of new power stations 
has put the brakes on the expansion of the nuclear programme, which aims to increase the 
proportion of electricity of nuclear origin to 40% of total electricity in 2030. 
 
Significant difficulties must be faced in increasing the proportion of hydroelectric energy and, 
above all, the renewable energies (such as wind power). There is a lack of political will and there 
are very few initiatives, as shown by a forecast revealing that these forms of energy will hardly 
increase their weighting in PEC over the coming decades. 
 
                                                 
14 UNFCCC, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period 1990-2005, FCCC/SBI/2007/30, 24/X/2007. 
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In regard to the second overarching objective –geographic diversification of energy imports–, at the 
outset, it must be stated that its progress is proving extremely slow as far as oil is concerned, as 
mentioned above (see Table 2.8 above). 
 
Indeed, it may be possible that dependence with respect to the Middle East will actually rise. In the 
words of an APERC report, ‘Despite oil’s declining share in the primary energy mix, dependence 
on the Middle East is expected to rise as imports from Asia –such as Indonesia and Malaysia– 
decline’ (APERC, 2006, p. 42). 
 
The high dependence on the Middle East and the likelihood that this will remain (or even increase), 
over the coming years are especially serious, particularly in view of the fact that the percentage of 
oil imports controlled by Japanese companies is very low (15% in 2005), in spite of the repeated 
attempts to increase investments abroad (Mitchell and Lahn, 2007; Lahn, 2007). 
 
Although links with Russia are both growing and promising (Koyama, 2007) and could lead to a 
reorientation of imports towards the former, financial and technical problems (the high cost and 
complexity of the planned oil pipeline between eastern Siberia and the Russian Pacific coast) have 
to be surmounted, as does the dispute over the Kuriles islands (or Northern Territories for the 
Japanese), as Buscynski (2006) points out. In addition, optimal exploitation of the Russian 
resources would require the collaboration of companies from Japan, China and South Korea, as well 
as the eventual involvement of the great US oil companies, given that exporting oil and LNG to the 
west coast of the US forms part of Russia’s strategic interests (Atsumi, 2007, p. 42). However, the 
Asian companies have displayed precious little interest in partnership projects to date (Choo, 2006) 
and it remains to be seen if American companies finally decide to invest massively in exporting 
hydrocarbons from the Russian Far East. 
 
In terms of the planned reduction in energy intensity, although it is very necessary, past experience 
would not appear to indicate that it will be easy to achieve. The improvement achieved between 
1973 and 1990 did not continue into 1990-2005. Smil (2007) highlights two factors accounting for 
this change in trends: an increase in energy intensity in heavy industry, especially in metal-
machinery and ceramics, and an increase of 45% in per capita consumption of residential 
electricity, due to increased home usage of electrical and electronic devices. Thus, while energy 
intensity in the US fell by 12%, in Japan it increased by 3%. The elasticity of PEC with respect to 
GDP, which was 0.12 in 1973-1980 and 0.51 in 1980-90, increased to 1.19 in 1990-2000 
(Kanekiyo, 2007a). It is true that in 2000-04 it was 0.16, but this can be partly explained by the 
higher GDP growth during this period. 
 
Table 2.10 shows that energy productivity (GDP in terms of kilogrammes of oil equivalent) fell by 
1.4% between 1990 and 2005, while it increased by 25% in the US and by 32% in Germany. Per 
capita consumption of electricity rose much more in Japan (21.8%) than in the US (11.9%) or 
Germany (10.4%). Table 2.10 also shows that South Korea performed substantially worse than 
Japan. 
 
Table 2.10. Consumption of primary energy and electricity, energy productivity and per capita GDP, for several 
countries 
 PEC PCpec PCelc Var90-04 GDP/kep Var90-04 GDPpcPPP 
 MtoeToe/inhab kwh/inhab US$ PPP US$ 
 2005 2005 2004 2004 2005 
Japan 530.5 4.15 8,459 21.8 6.4 -1.4 31,267 
South Korea 213.8 4.43 7,710 178.3 4.2 -6.3 22,029 
US 2,340.3 7.89 14,240 11.9 4.6 25.3 41,890 
Germany 344.8 4.18 7,442 10.4 6.2 31.6 29,461 
Spain 145.2 3.35 6,412 63.3 6.9 -4.9 27,169 
Sources: IEA, Selected Indicators and UNDP, Human Development Indicators. 
 
 12
With regard to strategic oil and gas reserves, it is curious that the Japanese government should 
insist, more than on increasing said reserves, on the possibility of having recourse to the IEA 
emergency mechanism and on the importance of the stocks of other consumer countries, such as 
China and India. In the words of former Minister Aso, ‘As uncertain and vulnerable elements in the 
oil market increase, the role of the IEA in ensuring global energy security takes on new importance. 
The Agency’s emergency response mechanism mobilises the 27 member countries to collectively 
release supplies from their oil stockpile in the event of unexpected supply disruptions [...]. An 
important task ahead of us is identifying how to work closely with non-member emerging 
economies [of the OECD] like China and India in enhancing their oil stockpiling system’ (Aso, 
2007, p. 37 and 38). 
 
Insofar as control of resources abroad is concerned, it is worthwhile recalling that the proportion of 
imports executed by Japanese companies is barely 15%. There is an urgent need to increase this 
proportion, but it may not be easy to do so, in view of the setbacks suffered by Japan in recent years 
in certain of its investments abroad.15 
 
Moreover, the possibility that similar problems could occur in central Asia must not be dismissed. 
Competition between Asia’s national oil companies (ANOCs) is becoming very intense there. For 
example, it cannot be ruled out that China’s rapprochement with Central Asia via Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (OCS) will cause growing difficulties for Japan in terms of its access to 
these supply sources (Herberg, 2007). However, Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to Central Asia 
(Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) in December of 2006, and those of Minister Amari –the head of the 
METI–, in January of 2007, were apparently successful for Japan, at least insofar as the supply of 
uranium is concerned. Kazakhstan possesses the world’s second largest reserves of this mineral, 
after Australia. 
 
In conclusion, of the five specific objectives included in Japan’s new energy strategy, it would 
appear that the following three are attainable: increasing efficiency by 30% by 2030 (as long as they 
change the habits of electricity consumption); reducing the part of oil in PEC to 40%;and increasing 
the proportion of electricity of nuclear origin to 40% (in the latter two cases, as long as the increase 
in nuclear power stations is not subject to technical or political setbacks). However, it is not at all 
obvious that the proportion of equity oil in the imports can be easily increased from 15% to 40%, in 
view of the heightened competition between Japanese, Chinese, Korean and Indian companies.16 
Lastly, it would appear very difficult to reduce the ratio of oil in the final energy consumption of 
the transport industry from 100% to 80%, given that such a reduction would require a very decisive 
commitment to biofuels such as ethanol, electric automobiles, engines based on photovoltaic cells 
and other systems; and it does not seem likely that this is going to happen without a change in the 
scope of car manufacturing and demand. 
 
2.4. Conclusions 
Japan’s energy horizon and the main elements of its new strategy –as detailed in the foregoing 
sections–, point to several conclusions: 
 
(1) Japan’s growing energy insecurity may increase its already considerable frictions with 
China (Calder, 2007; Khan, 2007; Liao, 2007), unless energy-related questions are treated in 
                                                 
15 In addition to the aforementioned case of Sakhalin-2, we should recall the Azadegan oil field, in Iran. In September 
2004, a consortium of Japanese companies led by Inpex agreed to participate in its development, but the conflict 
between Washington and Teheran concerning the Iranian nuclear programme led to the Japanese consortium postponing 
its investment. Lastly, in October 2005, Iran reduced the Japanese holding in Azadegan from 75% to 10%. See Watkins 
(2006) and Christoffels (2007, p. 25 and onwards). 
16 Nevertheless, Toichi (2006) argues that –given that Japan’s crude imports will be reduced from 4 to 3 million barrels 
a day between 2005 and 2030–, it is sufficient to double from 0.6 to 1.2 mbd the part controlled by Japanese companies 
in order to achieve the target of 40%. 
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isolation within the bilateral relationship (Gupta, 2008) and/or lead to higher cooperation on 
an international scale and between the two countries (for example in questions of maritime 
security). 
 
(2) Japan’s energy requirements may lead to it establishing increasingly closer links with Russia 
(as a way of reducing dependence on the Middle East), especially in the cases of the 
Siberian oil (via the future trans-Siberian oil pipeline) and the gas from Sakhalin and of 
Kovykta (Ahn, 2007). The importance that Central Asia might acquire in the future supply 
of oil and gas to Japan remains to be seen, although it would appear clear that this region 
(and especially Kazakhstan) will be of the utmost importance in obtaining mineral uranium. 
 
(3) Avoiding frictions with China and promoting imports of resources from the former USSR 
require a framework of international cooperation (obviously including these two countries, 
but perhaps India and the US too, as has been stated by observers including Blank, 2006, 
and Kangas, 2007). Due to the existence of a historical rivalry this is a question on which 
little progress has been made until relatively recently (Choo, 2006). 
 
(4) Japan needs to be more ambitious and muster a clear political will for the development of 
renewable energies, in view of the very low weighting that these forms of energy currently 
have despite the country’s technical sophistication. 
 
3. South Korea’s Energy Security Strategy: Caught in a Stronghold 
 
The Republic of Korea (henceforth South Korea throughout the present paper) is the world’s 10th 
largest consumer of energy (at 233.4 Mtoe), ahead of Brazil and Italy, and almost on a par with the 
UK. It is the world’s sixth biggest consumer of nuclear power, the seventh for oil, and ninth for 
coal.17 
 
Like Japan, its external dependence is very high. In 2006, its net energy imports reached 188.8 
Mtoe, that is to say 80.9% of its consumption. South Korea is a very important importer of coal and 
of LNG: the second in the world for both, after Japan. It is also the world’s ninth largest oil 
importer. 
 
From an energy security standpoint, South Korea presents a triple dilemma (Calder, 2005): a lack of 
energy resources, a high dependence with respect to oil, and a high dependence on the Middle East 
for oil and gas imports. 
 
South Korea only has small anthracite deposits, and limited hydroelectricity resources, meaning that 
it has to use imports and wood consumption for energy generation.18 Net imports, without taking 
nuclear power into account, totalled 96.5% of internal consumption (80.9%, as stated above, if the 
production of nuclear power is included). In 2006, oil accounted for 44% of primary energy 
consumption, a proportion which is higher than that for the world average (38%). Lastly, in 2006, 
the rate of dependence on imports of crude from the Middle East was 80.7%. In terms of LNG of 
imports, almost half of the imports in 2006 came from just two Persian Gulf countries: Qatar 
(25.6%) and Oman (20.7%), something which is important because two Asian countries (Indonesia 
and Malaysia) accounted for an additional 42%. 
 
This being said, it must be remembered that, thanks to important development of the petrochemical 
industry, South Korea is a net exporter of oil derivatives. In 2005, exports totalled 35.1 Mmt, while 
imports were 19.8 Mmt. 
                                                 
17 A general overview of South Korea’s energy situation can be seen in EIA (2007). 
18 South Korea also has some uranium resources, which remain practically unexplored. 
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3.1. Energy Production and Consumption 
Production of primary energy is very low (barely 44.6 Mtoe in 2006). Most of this production 
corresponds to nuclear power (37.3 Mtoe), to the wood and others category (4.3 Mtoe), to coal (2.1 
Mtoe) and to hydroelectricity (1.3 Mtoe). Although production has risen considerably (it stood at 
21.9 Mtoe in 1990), thanks to the efforts to develop nuclear power, hydroelectric energy and the 
renewable energies, it still accounts for only very small quantities. 
 
Primary energy consumption (PEC) stood at 233.4 Mtoe in 2006, and high growth has prevailed in 
recent years (it was 93.2 Mtoe in 1990). Growth has been constant, except in 1998, when there was 
a reduction to 165.5 Mtoe from the 179.6 Mtoe of 1997, as a consequence of the financial crisis of 
that period. However, in 1999, PEC was already over 180 Mtoe, according to the BP data (2007). In 
1980-2006, the annual average growth rate for PEC was 6.6%, almost as high as for GDP. 
 
The main reasons for such high growth have been: the rapid rise in GDP (6.8% in 1970-2005, 
despite significant slowdown over the last decade), significant expansion of heavy industry 
(cement, steel and petrochemicals) which is very energy-intensive,19 the marked progress of 
motorisation (car numbers rose from 557,000 in 1985 to 15.4 million in 2005), and the automation 
of the plants of the automobile and electronic component industries. 
 
In terms of the structure of primary consumption by energy sources (Table 3.1), it is worth noting 
that in 1996-2006 the percentage rate for oil fell from 62.3% to 43.6%, in favour of coal (which 
increased from 18.5% to 24.3%), natural gas (the weighting of which rose from 6.7% to 13.7%) 
and, to a lesser extent, of nuclear power (11.8% and 15.9%, respectively). In spite of significant 
diversification in oil, the fossil fuels still account for 82% of consumption. 
 
Table 3.1. South Korea: consumption of primary energy by energy types, 1995-2006 (thousands of toe and %) 
 1995 % 2000 % 2005 % 2006 % 
Coal 28,092 18.7 42,911 22.2 54,788 24.0 56,687 24.3 
Oil 93,955 62.5 100,280 52.0 101,526 44.4 101,831 43.6 
Natural gas 9,213 6.1 18,924 9.8 30,355 13.3 32,004 13.7 
Nuclear 16,757 11.1 27,241 14.1 36,695 16.1 37,187 15.9 
Hydroelectricity 1,369 0.9 1,402 0.7 1,297 0.6 1,305 0.6 
Renewable 1,051 0.7 2,130 1.1 3,961 1.7 4,358 1.9 
Total 150,437 100.0 192,888 100.0 228,622 100.0 233,372 100.0 
Source: MOCIE. 
 
With regard to distribution by sectors of the consumption of final energy, heavy industry accounts 
for the lion’s share (56% in 2006), and the weighting of this sector has even risen in recent years. 
The importance of heavy industry in the consumption of final energy is due to the country’s 
productive specialisation (heavy industry, petrochemicals, naval construction and car 
manufacturing) and to the development of an important refining industry. 
 
Table 3.2. South Korea: Consumption of final energy by sector, 1996 and 2006 (in %) 
 1996 2006
Heavy industry 51.4 56.0
Residential and commercial 24.0 20.7
Transport 22.6 21.0
Public and other 2.0 2.2
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: MOCIE. 
 
                                                 
19 For example, ethylene production reached 6.5 million tons in 2005, a six-fold increase since 1985 (WP-EPP, 2006, p. 
67). 
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As regards forecasts, APERC (2006) considers that PEC will reach 241.3 Mtoe in 2010, 303.5 Mtoe 
in 2020, and 351.7 Mtoe in 2030; that is to say, that it will rise by over 50% between 2006 and 
2030, although the rate of growth during this period (1.7%) will be much lower than that recorded 
between 1980 and 2006 (6.6%). In recent years, the rate of growth of PEC (3.2% in 2000-2006) has 
been considerably lower than this average. The two main reasons for this lower PEC growth since 
the end of the 1990s are the change in the productive structure towards the services and the 
information technology industries, and the general efficiency improvements which are expected.20 
Thus, the elasticity of consumption with respect to GDP, which was 1.1 in 1980-2002, will be 0.6 in 
2002-2030, according to the forecasts. 
 
Table 3.3. South Korea: forecasts for growth in consumption of primary energy (Mtoe and %) 
 PEC  AAGR
1980 41.4 1980-2002 7.4
2002 199.7 2002-2010 2.4
2010 241.3 2010-2020 2.3
2020 303.5 2020-2030 1.5
2030 351.7 2002-2030 2.0
Source: APERC, 2006. 
 
As shown in Table 3.4, the forecasts of the Korea Energy Economics Institute (KEEI) would 
suggest that, in PEC, the oil ratio will fall from 43.8% in 2006 to 38.1% in 2020, in favour of 
natural gas, nuclear power, hydroelectric energy and the renewable energies. The proportion 
corresponding to coal will remain stable at 24%. It is noteworthy that, according to these forecasts, 
the total for hydroelectric energy and renewables will be barely over 4% of PEC in 2020, and that 
the fossil fuels will account for three-quarters of PEC in this year. 
 
Table 3.4. South Korea: consumption forecasts for primary energy by types of energy, 2006, 2010 and 2020 (in 
%) 
 2006 2010 2020
Oil 43.6 41.8 38.1
Coal 24.3 25.9 24.0
Natural gas 13.7 15.4 15.7
Nuclear 15.9 14.0 18.0
Hydro and RE 2.5 2.9 4.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: MOCIE and KEEI. 
 
The forecasts for the distribution by sector of final energy consumption do not show significant 
changes, as shown in Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5. South Korea: forecasts for consumption of final energy by sector, 2006 and 2020 (in %) 
 2006 2020
Heavy industry 56.0 55.1
Transport 20.7 20.3
Res/com 21.0 22.1
Public and other 2.2 2.4
Source: MOCIE and KEEI. 
 
3.2. Imports 
The net energy imports were 188.8 Mtoe in 2006, equivalent to 80.9% of consumption. South 
Korea’s foreign dependence is, therefore, extreme. This dependence, moreover, has risen from 
74.1% in 1985 and 76.5% in 1990, although it has fallen slightly since 2000, as shown in Table 3.6. 
 
                                                 
20 In addition, naturally, to the effects of the 1997-1998 financial crisis, which meant, for example, that oil consumption 
reached a maximum of 2.4 mbd in 1997. Consumption fell to 2 mbd in 1998. In 2006, at 2.3 mbd, the figure was even 
lower than in 1997, according to BP data (2007). 
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Table 3.6. South Korea: production, consumption and net energy imports, 1985-2006 (thousands of toe and %) 
 1985 1990 2000 2006
Production 14,597 21,908 33,367 44,582
Consumption 56,296 93,192 192,887 233,372
NetM 41,699 71,284 159,520 188,790
Mn/Cons (%) 74.1 76.5 82.7 80.9
Source: MOCIE. 
 
In 2006, South Korea imported 101.8 million tonnes of oil, which meant 100% of its consumption. 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 3.7, over 80% of these imports were from the Middle East, where 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iran and Qatar are the main suppliers. In recent years, there has 
even been an increase in the dependence on the Middle East. Although dependence with respect to 
the Middle East is high, it is relatively diversified between countries from the region (Saudi Arabia, 
UAE, Kuwait, Iran and Qatar), as is also the case with Japan. There is still no significant increase in 
imports from Russia and Central Asia, although there is a slight increase in imports from Australia. 
 
Table 3.7. South Korea: oil imports by regions and countries of origin, 1995 and 2005 
 1995 2005
The Middle East 75.6 80.7
   Saudi Arabia 35.2 29.1
   UAE 11.0 17.5
   Kuwait 3.9 9.2
   Iran 10.6 8.3
   Qatar 1.7 6.2
Asia 14.5 9.1
   Indonesia 4.9 4.5
   China 4.9 1.0
Africa 5.9 4.0
Australia 0.8 3.8
Former USSR 0.4 1.0
Source: IEA. 
 
South Korea is a net exporter of oil derivatives, with a total of 15.3 Mmt in 2005 (16.4 Mmt in 
2000). The main consuming countries of these derivatives that year were China (28.1%), Japan 
(22.7%), the US (12.7%) and Indonesia (9.2%). 
 
The main suppliers of coal imports (54.4 Mmt in 2006) are Australia, China and Russia (Table 3.8). 
The strong increase in China’s weighting is worthy of note. It had been zero in 1995. 
 
Table 3.8. South Korea: coal imports by regions and countries of origin, 1995 and 2006 (thousands of mt and %) 
 1995 % 2006 %
Australia 9,159.0 35.7 17,637.1 32.4
Canada 2,157.0 8.4 942.7 1.7
China – 0.0 14,306.9 26.3
US 1,658.0 6.5 62.6 0.1
Russia – 0.0 4,058.1 7.5
Other 12,681.0 49.4 17,414.7 32.0
Total 25,665.0 100.0 54,422.1 100.0
Source: MOCIE. 
 
Given that South Korea is the second biggest world importer of LNG, the countries of origin of its 
imports are of great importance. All the gas imported to date has been in LNG form, due to the lack 
of gas pipelines, although several are planned. As Table 3.9 shows, halfway through the last decade 
over 90% of these imports were from two South-East Asian countries (Indonesia and Malaysia). 
The weighting of these two countries has fallen since then, due to factors including an increase in 
their internal demand. Qatar and Oman have become leading suppliers, and in 2006 these two 
Middle East countries accounted for almost half of the imports. 
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Table 3.9. South Korea: LNG imports by countries of origin, 1995 and 2006 (thousands of mt and %) 
 1996 % 2006 %
Indonesia 6,262.1 65.6 5,060.0 20.1
Malaysia 2,572.2 27.0 5,545.9 22.0
Brunei 707.0 7.4 849.8 3.4
Qatar – 0.0 6,458.8 25.6
Oman – 0.0 5,220.9 20.7
Other (1) 56.7 0.6 2,087.9 8.3
Total 9,539.5 100.0 25,221.9 100.0
(1) Australia, Algeria, Nigeria, Spain and Abu Dhabi. 
Source: MOCIE. 
 
The forecasts for growth in imports indicate that there will be persistent growth in all energy 
imports (oil, coal and LNG), although it will be at a lower rate than that of recent years. According 
to APERC estimates (2006), from a base of 189 Mtoe in 2006, net imports may raise to 239 Mtoe in 
2020, and 271 Mtoe in 2030. According to these data, gas imports could reach 72.9 Mtoe in 2030 
(they stood at 31.5 in 2006), while oil imports could rise from 101.8 in 2006 to 135.6 Mtoe in 2030. 
It is predicted that coal will grow little, from 54.6 Mtoe in 2006 to 62.8 Mtoe in 2030. 
 
3.3. Strategies to Guarantee Supply 
South Korea’s energy policy has been driven forward considerably in recent years. In February 
2006, the national parliament passed the Energy Framework Act and in November of that year the 
President created a National Energy Committee, with four sub-committees (energy policy, 
technology, development of resources and conflict management). 
 
South Korea’s energy strategy has significant similarities with that of Japan, given that both 
countries have similar structural features; for example, very low internal production, high oil 
dependence and a high dependence on the Middle East.21 
 
The five main objectives of South Korea’s energy security strategy can be summarised as follows: 
diversification of sources of energy, diversification of suppliers, consolidation of strategic oil 
reserves, conservation, rationalisation and the quest for efficiency, and development of resources 
abroad. 
 
First, the aim of resource diversification towards nuclear power and the renewables is the fruit of a 
desire to reduce external dependence and CO2 emissions. Opting for LNG, although it might be of 
interest for reasons of pricing and the proximity of certain suppliers, only partially resolves these 
problems. Furthermore, the recent growth in LNG consumption has been incredible: having risen 
from 18.9 Mmt in 2000 to 32 Mmt in 2006. 
 
Nuclear power has to face unfavourable public opinion, such that, as has already been mentioned, a 
significant increase in its contribution to PEC is not planned. The reverse is true for the renewable 
energies, which are now a priority objective. In particular, there is an official objective to increase 
the weighting of renewable energies (not including hydroelectric energy) in PEC from the 2.1% of 
2005 to a total of 5% in 2011. 
 
Secondly, South Korea aims to heighten the geographical diversification of its imports, by means of 
an increase in oil and gas imports from Russia and, to a lesser extent, from Central Asia.22 For the 
time being, Africa and Latin America are seen as much lower priorities for the supply strategy. The 
growth potential for oil imports from Siberia and gas imports from Sakhalin is enormous. In 2005, 
the countries of the former USSR accounted for barely 1% of the imports of crude. LNG imports 
                                                 
21 Note, however, that although the rate of self-sufficiency is similar in the two countries (18% with nuclear power and 
4% without it), Japan’s oil dependency is somewhat higher (47.4% in 2005) than that of South Korea (43.6% in 2006); 
the importance of the Middle East is also somewhat higher in Japan (88% as opposed to 81%). 
22 See ‘South Korea Wins Kurdistan Oil Contract’, The Financial Times, 15/II/2008. 
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from Russia are practically zero, in view of the fact that the four leading suppliers (Qatar, Malaysia, 
Oman and Indonesia), as stated above, account for 90% of said imports. As regards the possibility 
of ensuring that a gas pipeline reaches South Korea, the question is largely addressed as a measure 
to meet the energy requirements not only of Seoul but also of Pyongyang. This means that if the 
North Korean nuclear crisis were definitively resolved it could drive Russia and China to favour 
this option (Paik, 2005). This desire for diversification is very similar to that of Japan, and both 
countries are competing with China, especially in relation to Central Asia and Russia. 
 
Third, the creation and extension of a strategic oil reserve is a priority not only due to the 
importance of the same in the event of supply problems, but also to the IEA recommendations to its 
member countries. South Korea joined in April 2001. The strategic reserve is equal to 90 days of 
imports, an increase on the 60 days recorded at the start of 2001 (WG-EPP, 2006, p. 104). 
 
Fourth, Seoul is planning for much higher conservation, rationalisation and efficiency, in view of 
the fact that its energy intensity is very high for a country with Korea’s level of development.23 In 
2005, primary energy consumption for each US$1,000 of GDP was 0.34 in South Korea, as 
opposed to 0.21 in the US, 0.18 in Germany, 0.16 in Italy, 0.14 in the UK and 0.11 in Japan 
(MOCIE-KEEI, 2007, p. 63). The official target is to reduce energy intensity to 0.30 by 2012, an 
aim which does not seem very ambitious. Per capita energy consumption is very high and even 
higher than that of Japan, despite the fact that there is a substantial difference in the level of 
development. PEC by inhabitant (in Toe per person) in 2005 was 4.43 in South Korea, 4.16 in 
Japan, 4.18 in Germany, 3.88 in the UK, and 3.16 in Italy; although, obviously, this is lower than 
that of the US, which recorded 7.89 Toe per inhabitant (MOCIE-KIEE, 2007, p. 63). 
 
Finally, the government is attempting to foment greater activity in the development of resources 
abroad. However, Korean companies are entering into conflict with their Japanese and Chinese 
counterparts, especially where oil is concerned (Herberg, 2007; Mitchell and Lahn, 2007; Lahn, 
2007). All being said, there is also an official target to increase the national companies’ proportion 
of production abroad as a percentage of total imports from 3.7% in 2005 to 15% in 2013 for oil; and 
from 5.8% in 2005 to 30% in 2013 for LNG (Bang, 2007, p. 12). 
 
3.4. Conclusions 
South Korea’s situation of energy insecurity is very similar to that of Japan, although there are 
naturally a number of differences. The two countries share a dependence which remains high with 
respect to oil and a very high dependence with respect to energy imports. The following two 
differences stand out most: dependence on the Middle East is somewhat lower in South Korea than 
in Japan (80.7% as opposed to 87.9%, respectively, in 2005); conversely, the South Korean 
situation is notably worse in terms of energy intensity and per capita energy consumption (for 
example, it is significant that PEC per inhabitant was 4.43 Toe in Korea in 2005, as opposed to 4.15 
Toe in Japan, in spite of the difference in per capita income). 
 
The conclusions given above for Japan also apply to South Korea, although with certain nuances. 
 
First, South Korea’s energy insecurity means that it is competing with China and with Japan, but 
without being able to wield either China’s demographic and economic weighting or Japan’s level of 
development, despite the fact that the Koreans have been trying hard for many years to equal and 
even surpass Japan –something which they have achieved in a number of heavy industries–. The 
size and per capita income difference vis à vis its neighbours, means that, to a certain degree, South 
Korea is caught in a stronghold. 
 
                                                 
23 This high intensity is accounted for by inefficiency, but also by factors related to industrial specialisation and the 
importance of the refining industry. 
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Secondly, as with Japan, the will to diversify its imports from the Middle East –a region on which it 
has become increasingly dependent for oil and LNG in recent years– is driving South Korea to 
develop ties with Russia and, to a lesser degree, with Central Asia. If collaboration with Russia to 
secure oil from Siberia and Sakhalin-1 and gas from Kovykta and Sakhalin-2 is primordial in 
Japan’s case, it is no less so for South Korea, with the particularity that –since it is a continental 
country– the eventual links by oil pipeline and gas pipeline would appear to be easier. However, it 
should be recalled that the situation in North Korea is an added factor which could complicate this 
relationship, or which could rather act to facilitate it, in view of the fact that a definitive solution to 
the energy problems of North Korea must involve the creation of supply channels throughout the 
peninsula. 
 
Third, the need for more regional cooperation on matters of energy security is even more pressing 
for South Korea than for Japan, due to questions of size and those linked to the necessary 
improvement of inter-Korean relations. Thus, Seoul has a special interest in promoting energy 
cooperation in North-East Asia. It was not surprising, for example, that in 2004 it took the initiative 
in founding a mechanism to regulate ministerial level meetings, in order to develop inter-
governmental collaboration on issues of energy cooperation. In 2004, said initiative was 
consolidated by the constitution of Intergovernmental Collaborative Mechanism on Energy 
Cooperation in Northeast Asia. Its headquarters are in Ulan Bator, and its member countries are 
South Korea, Russia, Mongolia and North Korea, although still not Japan and China. 
 
Lastly, it is worth noting that the efforts to promote renewable forms of energy have been 
somewhat greater in South Korea than in Japan. While Seoul has set an official target to attain a 5% 
contribution of these energies (not including hydroelectric power) by 2011, Japan has no official 
target of this type, despite having a higher per capita income, and notwithstanding its technical 
superiority in certain industries. 
 
4. Implications of the Strategies of Japan and South Korea for the EU and Spain 
 
Although the implications are very diverse, the most significant may be listed below. 
 
Firstly, regional cooperation is essential to improving energy security in North-East Asia. It would 
afford very diverse advantages (Chidester and Kessler, 2007): it would bring down supply prices; it 
would facilitate improved distribution of costs (since it would include more investors); it would 
improve the reliability of supplies; it would make it possible –via better inter-connections– to 
respond to emergencies with better guarantees; and it would ensure that projects involving several 
countries (for example, oil or gas pipelines from Sakhalin to South Korea, passing through North 
Korea) became more rational and efficient. However, cooperation is only just getting underway 
and, to date, it has essentially been limited to the East Asia Summit, which, at its Cebu summit (in 
January 2007), created a regional cooperation mechanism geared towards pooling efforts in the face 
of a generalised situation in this part of the world: energy inefficiency, a lack of development of 
renewable energies, a high dependence on the Middle East and insufficient collaboration between 
the Asian countries in supply terms (Bustelo, 2007). 
 
The EU has a common energy policy that is of interest to North-East Asia (Gavin and Lee, 2007), 
given that its  long-term strategy features measures including improvement of inter-connections, 
fomenting saving, reducing the effect of greenhouse gas emissions, and increasing the contribution 
of renewable energies to primary energy consumption –and that of biofuels in transport sector 
consumption–. 
 
Within the EU, Spain has been very active in defending favourable positions, including those to 
promote a European energy market, to diversify supply sources, to stimulate renewable energy 
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sources, and to include political dialogue with the Mediterranean region (in particular Algeria and 
Morocco) as part of the EU’s priorities. 
 
Secondly, competition between the EU and North-East Asia for Central Asia’s natural gas will 
surely be disadvantageous for both regions. In the future, it may be possible that Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan are connected by gas pipeline both with Europe (a trans-Caspian gas pipeline, that 
would connect with the southern Caucasus and with Nabucco) and with East Asia (via China, which 
has already signed an agreement with Turkmenistan,24 or even via India,25 although this second 
route would have to overcome serious political difficulties). 
 
For the EU, the connection with Central Asia is a way of increasing access to resources (supply 
from Russia might prove to be insufficient, given the country’s strong internal demand, scant 
investment in infrastructures, and the likely increase in European demand), diversifying the supply 
sources, and avoiding the pressures of Russia, which is increasingly inclined to wield its energy 
influence as the centrepiece of its foreign policy (Cornell and Nilsson, 2008). 
 
If North-East Asia and the EU are simultaneously interested in Central Asia’s gas resources, the 
results, if cooperation is lacking, could be negative for both sides.26 It might therefore be advisable 
to commence some sort of dialogue on energy issues involving Central Asia, to take place during 
ASEM, or at a specially-created ad hoc forum. 
 
Thirdly, the conjunction of Russia’s strategic interest in bringing out the value of its eastern energy 
resources (Simonia, 2006) and the interest of the countries of North-East Asia in diversifying their 
supplies from the Middle East might lead to high a Asian dependence on Russia. The efforts which 
the EU has been making for a number of years now to reduce its dependence with respect to Russia 
could be a point of reference if, as planned, Japan and South Korea diversify their oil supply from 
the Middle East and diversify their gas imports from South-East Asia. 
 
Fourth and last, Spain shares certain common features with Japan and South Korea: a high external 
dependence (81.2% in 2006, very similar to that of the two Asian countries), diversification from 
oil and coal towards gas and renewable energy sources,27 diversification of suppliers, a serious 
problem of energy inefficiency, high greenhouse gas emissions etc. 
 
In recent years, due to its great capacity for LNG imports, Spain has achieved quite significant 
success in diversification in terms of sources and geography. Between 2000 and 2006 it 
considerably reduced the relative weighting of coal and oil in favour of natural gas and the 
renewable energies, while simultaneously diversifying supplies of natural gas from Algeria towards 
countries like Nigeria, Qatar, Egypt and Trinidad and Tobago. This success was due to the big 
increase in its regasification capacity: Spain is currently the world’s third-largest importer of LNG 
(behind Japan and South Korea) and its LNG imports account for practically half those of the EU as 
a whole. In addition, Spain has managed to create a considerable wind power capacity, although the 
increase in energy intensity between 1996 and 2004 prevented an increase in renewable energies as 
a proportion of total energy consumption. In other words, Spain is able to offer countries with 
                                                 
24 The gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and the Chinese region of Xinjiang, via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, is 
planned for 2009. Spanning 2,000 kilometres, it will have the capacity to transport 30,000 million cubic metres a year. 
See Pao (2007). 
25 India has great interest in developing a pan-Asian network of natural gas inter-connections and, more specifically, in 
executing the TAPI gas pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India). See Tapi (2006) for an analysis of India’s 
interests in the regional context. 
26 In more general terms, Paltsev and Reilly (2007) forecast that, if a regional gas market is developed in East Asia –
connected with the Middle East, Central Asia and Russia– there could be a significant spiralling effect on gas prices in 
Europe. 
27 Although the weighting of oil is more or less similar in the three countries, Spain is ahead in terms of natural gas 
(21% of PEC, as opposed to 14% in both Japan and South Korea). 
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similar structural features –such as Japan and Korea– its experience in diversification of sources, 
especially with regard to the development of certain types of renewable energies –including wind 
power, of course– but also in production of electricity from waste and biomass. 
 
And Spain itself could also learn from Japan and South Korea in relation to increasing 
regasification capacity, given that the totality of the two Asian countries’ natural gas imports are in 
LNG format. Spain can learn from Japan in improvement of energy efficiency (conservation and 
saving): in 2005, its energy intensity was 0.11 Toe for each US$1,000 of GDP (2000), while this 
figure stood at 0.21 in Spain and 0.34 in South Korea. We should recall that, in Japan, oil 
consumption, as well as per capita energy consumption, has fallen in recent years28, and that energy 
consumption in heavy industry has remained constant for 30 years. Japan is a very advanced 
country in terms of energy saving, as a consequence of its successful combination of cutting edge 
techniques (home appliances and low consumption cars, hybrid cars etc.), high petrol and electricity 
prices, frugality in daily life, the popular obsession with saving, subsidies for solar power and for 
the installation of fuel cells in homes, etc. 
 
General Conclusions 
As we have seen throughout this paper, Japan and South Korea are important consumers of energy, 
not only in terms of East Asia, but also on a world level; although their weighting has largely been 
overshadowed in recent times by the extraordinary rise of China. In addition, the two Asian 
countries have a dependence on foreign suppliers equal to over 80% of consumption, which they 
have not been able to significantly reduce in recent years. It is within this context that we have to 
analyse the effects that the recent changes in the world energy horizon (increasingly higher 
awareness of the finite nature of the fossil fuels, an increase in the geopolitical risks in the main 
producing regions, a large increase in demand from China and India, energy nationalism in certain 
countries, etc.) have had on the energy security strategies of Tokyo and Seoul. 
 
Both countries are aiming to speed up diversification of sources away from oil and coal (which, 
jointly, still account for two thirds of primary energy consumption) and towards natural gas, nuclear 
power and renewable energy. This goal not only responds to a desire to reduce external dependence 
(which is worsened by the long and vulnerable transportation routes for crude and LNG), but also to 
the demands for a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, given that in both countries 
over 80% of oil imports are from the Middle East and that gas imports, in LNG form, are very 
concentrated in just a few South-East Asian and Middle Eastern countries, the governments have 
set themselves the target of increasing the weighting of Russia and Central Asia, and, to a lesser 
extent, that of Australia, Africa and Latin America, in their supplies from abroad. Given the 
important crude and gas fields that Russia is developing in western Siberia and Sakhalin, and the 
prospects for better access to the resources of Central Asia (particularly in terms of gas and 
uranium), it is likely that the importance of the former Soviet republics to the energy supply of 
Japan and South Korea will increase. But geographical diversification does entail a number of 
difficulties –especially in the case of oil, a resource for which dependence with respect to the 
Middle East might even increase–. This is not to say that LNG imports might not also increase, in 
view of the high internal consumption of countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, whose 
resources are, moreover, the subject of fierce regional rivalry. Such a development would be 
worrying, especially in view of the fact that the crude or gas effectively controlled by Japanese and 
Korean companies has to date constituted only a small part of imports. Lastly, Japan and South 
Korea are seeking to reduce energy intensity; this is very high in the latter country (which has 
extremely high per capita energy consumption), and, although relatively low in the case of Japan, it 
has nevertheless increased over the last 15 years, as opposed to what has happened during this 
period in Germany or even in the US. 
                                                 
28 At 4.15 tep, per capita PEC is, lower than in Germany and France, and half that of the US and Canada. See AIE, Key 
World Energy Statistics 2007, Paris, 2007. 
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The past experience and potential of Japan and South Korea in regard to energy security may be of 
tremendous interest to the EU and to Spain. On the one hand, the EU’s common energy policy 
could, in certain aspects, serve as an inspiration for the development of regional cooperation in this 
respect in East Asia. This is still in its initial stages and is essential for management of the joint 
needs of countries like China, Japan and South Korea. From Southern Asia they will be joined by 
India very shortly. EU experience may also be useful as a mirror into which the two Asian countries 
could look in regard to dependence on supplies from Russia. In other words, the willingness of 
Japan and South Korea to reduce their dependence on the Middle East –a region which is 
potentially very unstable– could throw them headlong into the arms of Russia, and it is not clear 
that this would be wholly positive. It is obvious that geographical proximity and the importance of 
the resources from Sakhalin and western Siberia mean that it will be reasonable to increase the 
weighting of Russian supplies to East Asia, but such a development could lead to excessive 
dependence on this country, a situation shown by EU experience to not exactly be very advisable. 
 
Another point to take into account is that the lack of cooperation between the two regions could 
lead to a significant increase in the price of gas in Europe. This might occur if both the EU and 
Eastern Asia establish gas pipeline links with Central Asia as is likely to be the case (given that the 
link between Turkmenistan and China is now under construction) and in view of the fact that 
demand in the Asian countries is likely to significantly increase. In order to avoid this scenario, 
which would also be harmful for Asian consumers, it would be advisable to establish a mechanism 
for dialogue and consultations between the EU and the East Asian countries on energy supplies in 
Central Asia. 
 
Lastly, Spain could learn a lot from Japan and South Korea in terms of capacity for regasification 
and LNG imports, given the importance of these activities in the two Asian countries. It should not 
be forgotten that Japan and South Korea are the two leading importers of LNG and that they are 
quite far ahead of Spain, which is in third place. As is well known, the county’s increased capacity 
for importing LNG has brought great benefits to Spain in its strategy to diversify energy sources 
and supplies, such that it will probably remain a priority in the coming years. Lastly, the converse is 
also true, insofar as the two Asian countries could also benefit from the lessons learnt in Spain’s 
case, in terms of driving forward renewable energies in general and wind power in particular. 
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